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CASES NOTED
faced with the contribution question where a Pennsylvania statute allows
contribution to be enforced' and Ohio law denies it, the court had to make
a choice of laws. Of necessity the court looked to the Ohio law'" to dis-
cover whether it was substantive or procedural in this particular case. By
using the rationale that there was an "implied engagement of each to bear
the common burden" the court held the right of contribution to be "quasi-
contractual". After finding that the contract law which gives rise to the
right of contribution is substantive, the court applied it in conformity with
conflict rules.
20
Vith the law clear on the contribution aspect of this case the only
arguable portion of the opinion is found in the court's holding the Ohio
law to be substantive. It appears that the court considered contribution to
be a right and since basic classification rules hold that the law of substance
is that law which creates a right, it concluded that the Ohio law denying
contribution was substantive. Contrary to this, the Pennsylvania statute
procedurally allows enforcement of this equitable right. Would it not have
been as correct to look to the Ohio law and discover that Ohio law does not
allow enforcement of the equitable right of contribution? With this find-
ing the court could then have held the Ohio law to be procedural and could
have applied the Pennsylvania statute, thereby preventing this apparently
inequitable result.
CRIMINAL LAW - CONVICTION FOR VAGRANCY UNDER
CALIFORNIA STATUTE
The defendant was charged with two offenses defined in separate para-
graphs of one vagrancy statute.' These offenses took place almost a month
apart and he was given two sentences to run consecutively. Held, on appeal,
only one sentence can be imposed for the commission of any or all of the
offenses set out in the one statute. People v. Ailington, 229 P. 2d 495 (Cal.
App. 1951).
18. PA. STATS. tit. 12, § 2081 (1939); Kelly v. Pa. R.R., 7 FRl) 524 (D. C.
Pa. 1948); Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 9 F. R. 1). 612 (I). C. Pa. 1950); Anstine v.
Pa. R. R., 352 Pa. 43 A.2d 109 (1945).
19. See note 12 supra.
20. See notes 13 and 14 supra.
1 CAL. PEN. ConE § 647 (1949).
"l. Every person without visible means of living . . .; or
2. Every beggar who solicits alms as a business; or
3. Every person who roams from place to place without any lawful business; or
4. Every person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, or confidence operator
... having no visible means of support . . .; or
5. Every idle, or lewd, or dissolute person, or associate of known thieves; or
6. Every person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the
night, without any visible or lawful business; or
7. Every person who lodges in any barn . . . or place other than such as is kept for
lodging purposes, without the permission of the owner . . .; or
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Cenerally vagrancy statutes have no application to single instances of
conduct which, if habitual, would amount to vagrancy." One of tle necessary
elements of the crime is a continuendo.' This means that acts constituting
one a vagrant cannot be committed at one point in tine, but must extend
over a period.4 Expressed in another way, vagrancy is a condition, not an
act.5, Ordinarily, a course of conduct or manner of life, rather than a
single act, is necessary to give rise to a charge of vagrancy.6  But, on the
other hand, the records abound with cases in which a single act sufficed.
Some acts are so consistent with the character of a vagrant that one
such act will suffice to convict.7
Further, a count is not double because it charges the commission of
the offensc in several of the methods prescribed by this type of statute,
none of the alleged being repugnant to the other.8  "In other words, if
a person is a gambler, lie is a vagrant, and if, in addition thereto, lie
violatcs at the same time the other definitions as set out in the statute
he is still a vagrant. It is the crime of vagrancy that is denounced by the
statute, and the subheads simply define what a vagrant is.""
In the instant case the defendant was found to have engaged in
lewd and lascivious conduct on one occasion, and then, about a month
later, to have been a "peeping Tom." \Vith a show of reluctance, the
court interpreted the statute as maeaning that the condition of being a
vagrant, rather than the acts committed, was to be punished. In the
words of the court: "The punishment provided by section 647 is not for
doing, but for being; for being a vagrant."' 0 To strengthen its decision, the
court iade reference to a number of cases in which a statute similarly
constructed had been interpreted.' However, these cascs are readily dis.
8. Every person who lives in or about houses of ill fame; or
9. Every person who acts as runner or capper for attorneys...; or
10. Every common prostitute; or
11. Every common drunkard; or
12. Every person who loiters, prowls or wanders upon the private property of an-
other, in the nighttime, without visible or lawful business with the owner or
occupant thereof; or who . . . peeks in the door or window of any structure
located thereon and which is inhabited by hunian beings . .
Is a vagrant, and is punishable by ...
2. People v. 1)cuby, 108 Cal. 54, 40 Pac. 1051 (1895); In re Jordan. 90 Mich. 3, 50
N.W. 1087 (1892); sce People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 46, 91 Pac. 997, 999 1907).
3. Arnmstead v. State, 11 Okla. Crins. Rep. 649, 150 Pac. 511 (1915).
4. Ex parte Oates, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 79, 238 S.W. 930 (1921).
5. Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. Rep. 177, 138 S.W. 759 (1911).
6. State v. Suman, 216 Minn. 293, 12 N.W.2d 620 (1944).
7. Ex p rte Lund, 137 Cal. App. 616, 31 P.2d 221 (1934); People v. Scott, 113 Cal.
App. 778, 296 Pac. 601 (1931).
8. Cody v. State, 118 Ga. 784, 45 S.E. 622 (1903).
9. Brannon v. State, 16 Ala. App. 259, 260, 76 So. 991, 992 (1917).
10. People v. Allington, 229 P.2d 495, 500 (Cal. App. 1951).
11. CAL. PEN. Co E § 470 (1949), People v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486, 55 Pac. 581
(1898), People v. Leyshon, 108 Cal. 440, 41 Pac. 480 (1895), Pcople v. Harrold, 84
Cal. 567, 24 Pac. 106 (1890), People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507 (1865) (forgery); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 508 (1949), People v. Fisher, 16 Cal. App. 271, 116 Pac. 688 (1911)
(embezzlement); CAL. PEN. CODE § 218 (1949), People v. Thompson, 111 Cal.
242, 43 Pac. 748 (1896) (train robbery); CAL. PEN. CODE § 499(a) (1949), Bealmear v.
CASES NOTED
tinguishable because those statutes defined various stages in the accomplish-
ment of one specific crime. The various steps were not separate crimes,
for as the crime progressed, the acts merged into one crime.12  The opinion
makes no mention of a holding by the superior court of a contiguous
district in which two separate sentences were given for the violation of
two of the sub-paragraphs of the same vagrancy statute. 3
If the vagrancy statute were the only one in the penal code of Cali-
fornia which dealt with the diverse acts enumerated, the court might well
have some doubt as to legislative intent. Such is not the ease, because
separate statutes penalize individual acts of lewdness, 14 trespass to prop-
erty,' 5 living in or about a house of ill fame,'0 prostitution'7 and some
instances of drunkenness;' and each act would be indictable separately.
This is the real justification for the result reached in the instant case.
'Fhe only logical conclusion is that the vagrancy statute merely attempts
to encompass all those things which would characterize a vagabond or an
incorrigible rogue to insure that these anti-social individuals could be
prosecuted for their undesirable condition as such. The double penalty
idea is incompatible with this view.
CRIMINAL LAW - MORAL TURPITUDE
An alien was ordered to be deported under the Immigration Act of
19171 having twice been sentenced for terms of more than one year for
conspiring to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits. Held,
that this crime involved moral turpitude. Jordan v. De George, 71 Sup.
Ct. 703 (1951).
Apart from being a basis for the deportation of an alien, moral
turpitude has been employed in widely divcrgent situations, for example: as
a criterion in determining whether certain language is slanderous,2 for
impeachment of witnesses,3 in disbarment proceedings, 4 for revocation of
Southern California Edison Co., 22 Cal.2d 337, 139 P.2d 20 (1943) (theft of electricity
by tapping wires),
12. Bealmear v. Southern California Edison Co.. supra note 11.
13. People v. Ambrose, Superior Court. Dept. One, Riverside County, No. 25249,
May 19, 1934. (Memo decision) (cited by 23 CALIF. L. Rev. at 514 for this proposition).
14. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 273(g), 288, 311, 312, 313, 647(a), 968 (1949).
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 602 (1) (1949).
16. CAL. PEN. CODE § 315 (1949).
17. Ibid.
18. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 273(g), 367(d), 367(e) (1949).
L 39 S'rAT. 889 (1917) as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155 (a) (1946) . . . any alien
.who is hereafter sentenced more than once ... because of conviction in this country
of any crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any tine after entry . . shall,
upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported
2. Baxter v. Mohr, 37 Misc. 833, 76 N.Y. Supp. 983 (N. Y. City Ct. 1902).
3. Drazen v. New Iaven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 At!. 861 (1920); 6
Jo NEs, COMMENTARIES oN EvENCt § 2441 (2d ed. 1926).
4. In re Koptic, 406 ill. 141, 92 N.E.2d 462 (1950).
